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THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND THE
BELL SYSTEM: ABDICATION OF REGULATORY RESPONSIBILITY
The Bell System,1 almost since its inception, has developed with the
avowed intent to monopolize the telecommunications industry in this
country.2 Documentation of its success is almost superfluous; to most
Americans "telephone company" and "Bell" are synonymous. Bell pro-
vides over eighty per cent of the telephones in this country and over
ninety per cent of all inter-city transmission.8 In addition, it produces,
through its manufacturing subsidiary, Western Electric, about three-
quarters of the telephone equipment, insulated wire and cable manu-
factured in this country.' This leviathan is tolerated despite a national
policy generally favoring competition because, given the economies of
scale available in telephone transmission, the forced atomization of tele-
phone companies would involve wasteful duplication of facilities. Instead,
the telephone industry is extensively regulated by the Federal Com-
munications Commission,5 which ostensibly serves to insure that Bell
operates its monopoly in the public interest. The focus of this note will
be on one segment of the Bell monopoly-the telephone equipment
industry-and the adequacy of the FCC response to that monopoly,
particularly to Bell's efforts to extend that monopoly to apparatus peri-
pheral to the telephone system.
I. Peripheral Equipment Restrictions
The Bell System until recently required that virtually all equipment
1. The Bell System includes American Telephone & Telegraph Co., [hereinafter
AT&T], twenty-two Bell operating companies, Western Electric, and Bell Telephone
Laboratories. Most of the operating companies are wholly owned by AT&T. AT&T also
owns 99.8 per cent of Western's stock. Western and AT&T each own fifty per cent of
Bell Laboratories.
2. See Investigation of the Telephone Industry in the United States, HousE
Doc. No. 340, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 145-46 (1939) :
... Bell's watchword has been 'one system, one policy, universal service'....
It has deemed competition to be harmful from the viewpoint of both the
subscriber and the stockholder, harmful to the subscriber because of the
expense incident to duplicate facilities and harmful to the stockholder because
of the threat to profits.
3. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (Rate Investigation), 9 F.C.C.2d 30,
38 (1967). Bell also provides virtually all radio and television transmission facilities and
is the only American carrier providing voice transmission in international com-
munications.
4. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (Private Line Rates), 34 F.C.C. 244,
280 (1961).
5. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 151 ff. (1964). Federal regulation of
the telephone industry was initially under the Interstate Commerce Comnission. 36
Stat. 544 (1910). The Bell operating companies are regulated by state agencies; AT&T,
as operator of the long distance service, is regulated by the FCC.
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attached to the telephone system be provided by the telephone companies.'
This attachment restriction, even as now modified, is strongly anti-
competitive, foreclosing the market for telephone attachments to independ-
ent suppliers except for sales to the telephone companies. Thus these
suppliers-and the public-must rely on Bell, which is affiliated with a
competing manufacturer, for a determination of whether an attachment
will be marketed. Also the telephone companies may refuse to interconnect
the Bell System network with another communication system. Inter-
connection is a potent weapon where one firm controls virtually all inter-
city communications, and the Bell System has not been reluctant to wield
this advantage to eliminate or harass competition.! To the extent that
refusal to interconnect reduces the ability of other communication systems
to survive, it also reduces the equipment market available to unaffiliated
suppliers. In the case of both attachments and the communications
systems affected by the interconnection restrictions, the equipment in-
dustry is actually or potentially highly competitive with a large number
of firms and generally low economies of scale and is characterized by
rapid technological advances.8 Thus these restrictions work against
public interest by barring improvements from use with the telephone
system and hampering competition which would be likely to develop
more efficient communications equipment.
State agencies have consistently accepted Bell's justification that
these restrictions are essential for the "protection of the integrity" of the
telephone system.' The FCC was amenable to this contention to the
extent that in 1955, after a six year delay, it upheld the telephone
6. Bell had a complete prohibition againt non-Bell attachments until the Hush-
A-Phone decision, discussed in text at note 14-18, after which the restrictions covered
devices involving direct electrical attachment or connection with another communications
system. Following the FCC's decision in Carterfone (see discussion in text at note 26
et seq.), Bell allows all 'interconnection subject to restrictions on power input and the
requirement that a Bell-provided protection device and network control signalling
device be used with the customer's equipment. A network control signalling device is in
its simplest form a telephone dialing mechanism. There are some exceptions to these
restrictions, such as the federal government and right-of-way companies. Independent
telephone companies generally adhere to similar restrictions by adopting the Bell tariff.
7. See Response of the United States Department of Justice, F.C.C. Docket No.
16979, at 34-35.
AT&T has used this power [to refuse interconnection] as a weapon against
new forms of competition as they have appeared-such as private microwave
systems-as it did historically against competing telephone companies.
See also Beelar, Cables in the Sky and the Striugle for Their Control, 21 FED. COMM.
B.J. 26 (1967).
8. See Response of the Business Equipment Manufacturers Ass'n, F.C.C. Docket
No. 16979, at 125.
9. See, e.g., Racine Flash Cab Co. v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 65 P.U.R. 3rd 321
(Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm'n 1966); Netsky v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 65 P.U.R. 3rd 145
(Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1966); Peters Sunset Beach, Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 60 P.U.R. 3rd 363 (Minn. R.R. & Whse Comm'n 1965).
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companies in invoking the tafiff restrictions against the use of a. 9up like
device which merely snapped on to the telephone handset, serving'to
provide privacy in much the same manner as, cupping the hand around the
transmitter." Although the Commission was unable to find, thatt.the
device caused any physical impairment of .the. telephone facilities, it
concluded that the device "is deleterious to the telephone system aihd
injures the service rendered by it."" On appeal, the FCC'.s decision was
reversed, with the court holding that the restriction of this device was an
"unwarranted interference with the telephone subscriber's right reason-
ably to use his telephone in ways which are privately beneficial without
being publicly detrimental."' 2 Although the court based its decision on
the failure to show that Hush-A-Phone harmed the telephone system,"
it clearly saw the danger in tariff restrictions which allow a competitor of
the manufacturers' to determine if a piece of equipment may be marketed.
Thus it questioned
. . . the reasonableness of a tariff which places control over
petitioner's business in the hands of the [telephone companies]
in the first instance. A system whereby the [telephone com-
panies] may market equipment until such time as the com-
mission orders a halt, while petitioners may not market com-
petitive equipment until the commission gives them an auth-
orization, seems inherently unfair.'
On remand, the FCC ordered the telephone companies to allow
not only the Hush-A-Phone, but also to adopt a much less restrictive
tariff. The Commission found that
... an inescapable conclusion of the court's opinion is to render
such tariff regulations unjust and unreasonable insofar as they
may be construed or applied to bar a customer from using other
devices which serve the customer's convenience in his use of
10. Hush-A-Phone Corp., 20 F.C.C. 391 (1955).
11. Id., at 420.
12. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
13. Id., at 269. "It would seem that, although the Commission has no such control
in general, there is asserted a right to prevent the subscriber from achieving [low and
distorted] tones by the aid of a device other than his own body." The court noted other
adverse effects which the FCC said resulted from Hush-A-Phone. These included
"receiving impairment," i.e., ". . . the size and shape of some heads is such that If a
Hush-A-Phone is held sealed to the mouth, the receiver will not be 'well seated on the
ear,' so that the user will not hear as well what is said by the other party." The court
noted that, "The Commission does not indicate why a Hush-A-Phone user would keep
the phone glued to his lips when listening rather than spealdng. Nor does it appear why
the user may not, as a matter of his own choice, impair his ability to hear in order to
attain privacy of speech." Id., at 269 n.10.
14. Id., at 268 n.9.
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the facilities furnished by the defendants and which do not
injure the telephone company's employees or facilities or the
public in the use of defendant's service, or impair the operation
of the telephone service.15
Bell's response to the Commission's order was a new tariff allowing
customer-owned attachments with the exception of devices involving
"direct electrical connection to the equipment or other facilities of the
Telephone Company," and devices "to interconnect any line or channel
of the Telephone Company with any other communication line or channel
of the Company or of any other person."' The FCC allowed this tariff
to go into effect,'" with the result that the anti-competitive potential
recognized by the court in Hush-A-Phone remained virtually unscathed.
The lawfulness of these restrictions was challenged in 1965 by Carter
Electronics Corporation, manufacturer of the Carterfone, an acoustical
device designed to connect mobile radiotelephone stations with the public
telephone system. When sales for the device were hindered, Carter filed a
private antitrust suit against American Telephone and Telegraph Co.,
Southwestern Bell and General Telephone of the Southwest.' The federal
district court held that the FCC, by virtue of its intricate scheme of
regulations and the technical nature of restrictions, had primary juris-
diction for the resolution of "questions relating to the justness, reasonable-
ness, validity and effect of the tariff and practices complained of." 9
The FCC then ordered a hearing on the lawfulness of the tariff
restrictions. Before the Hearing Examiner, the tariff restrictions were
15. Hush-A-Phone Corp., Decision and Order on Remand, 22 F.C.C. 112, 113
(1957).
16. AT&T Tariff, F.C.C. No. 132, para. B.7 and B.24.
17. The FCC took no action with regard to the reasonableness of these restrictions
beyond permitting them to go into effect. In an investigation in 1962, the Commission
refused the carriers' request that it declare the tariff restrictions reasonable. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 32 F.C.C. 337, 340 (1962). Consequently, when the
Commission found the restrictions unreasonable in Carterfone, (see text at note 18
infra) it held that they were illegal since inception. As a result of this holding, parties
injured during that period may recover damages and attorney's fees under 47 U.S.C. §
206 (1964), or file an antitrust suit seeking treble damages. See note 19 infra.
18. Carter v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 250 F.Supp. 188 (N.D. Tex.),
a) d, 365 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1966). Carter alleged a conspiracy among the Bell com-
panies and General Telephone & Electronics, the largest non-Bell phone company, to
monopolize the radiotelephone equipment market. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (1964). Although
the opinion does not make it clear, the further claim under the Clayton Act, § 3, 15
U.S.C. § 14 (1964), probably alleges that the telephone companies are illegally tying
the lease of interconnection devices to the lease of the telephone.
19. Id. at 192. The court retained jurisdiction for determination of the anti-trust
issues after the FCC had ruled. Although the injunctive relief sought is no longer
necessary, Carter may recover treble damages. See Carnation v. Pacific Westbound
Conference, 383 U.S. 213 (1966); Hewitt-Robbins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight Ways Inc.,
371 U.S. 84 (1962).
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attacked as unreasonable under the Hush-A-Phone decision,2" since there
was no showing of harm to the telephone system. The restrictions were
also attacked as unwarranted interference with the telephone subscriber's
right to use his telephone in a way privately beneficial and without
public detriment. These blanket restrictions were unnecessary since min-
imum technical standards would be sufficient to protect the integrity of
the telephone system. The restrictions also have undesirable anti-competi-
tive aspects since the source of connecting devices is limited to the
telephone companies, and technical developments in wire and radio
communication are stifled. Accordingly, the relief sought was not only
removal of the restrictions on the Carterfone, but also cancellation of the
tariff in its entirety and the institution of minimum technical standards
for protection of the telephone system.2'
Bell contended that the Carterfone was in fact harmful to the
telephone system, reciting a list of problems associated with its use, but
did not rely solely upon the specific shortcomings of the device. Its
position was that the blanket tariff restrictions were reasonable and
necessary for the protection of the telephone system. As common carriers,
the Bell operating companies are responsible to the public and the
regulatory agencies for the furnishing of telephone service; allowing
interconnection would divide that responsibility by removing portions of
the system from the carriers' control. Thus, regardless of the harmless-
ness of the particular interconnection device used, the very fact of
interconnection would allegedly "inevitably result in degradation of
service."22 The argument for development of technical standards for
interconnection was rejected as "impractical," a somewhat surprising
position since the Bell System is interconnected with over 1900 independ-
ent telephone company systems using diverse equipment. This inter-
connection extends in many cases even to integration with the Bell
Direct Distance Dialing network.2" Bell further stated that there was no
guarantee that these proposed technical standards would be met, or that
the equipment would be properly maintained, a rather cynical view of the
competency of non-Bell manufacturers and the interest of customers in
20. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
21. See Proposed Findings of Facts and Conclusions by Common Carrier Bureau,
F.C.C. Docket Nos. 16942 & 17073, at 38-39.
22. Brief and Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Bell System Parties,
F.C.C. Docket Nos. 16942 & 17073, at 20. "It is not too much to say that if inter-
connection were widely permitted, the regulated telephone industry could no longer be
held responsible for the quality of service." Id., at 21. The "inherent degradation"
contention has no more substance than the above quote indicates.
23. See Response of the Business Equipment Manufacturers' Ass'n, F.C.C. Docket
No. 16970, at 129.
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assuring the proper functioning of their equipment.2 4 Use of customer-
provided equipment, Bell asserted, would also destroy the "economies
which result from unified control of the selection, design, installation,
operation and maintenance of the telephone network," and serve, ironical-
ly, as an impediment to the introduction of improvements into the tele-
phone system. Finally, Bell raised the specter of higher costs of telephone
service to the general body of subscribers, who would have to compensate
for the loss of revenue from those able to utilize their own equipment.
Bell, in conclusion, wished the FCC to hold that interconnection should
be allowed only where an exceptional public interest exists, and to find
that interest lacki-ng in the case of Carterfone, largely because of the
existence of the Bell System mobile radio service.2"
The Hearing Examiner found the Carterfone itself to be harmless,
but accepted the carriers' rather dubious position on the reasonableness
of the tariff generally and refused to eliminate the restrictions because
of what was without substantiation referred to as the "risk of serious
harm to the heart of the nation's communications system."26 He did note
the "inherent unfairness" of the restrictions to unaffiliated suppliers but
indicated that the solution of the problems lay in the carriers' establish-
ment of a process of expeditious approval or disapproval of attachments.
The Commission reversed the Examiner's decision in part by ordering
the tariff stricken entirely as unreasonable but left the development of the
tariffs in the hands of the carriers,2 7 thereby assuring that any benefit
derived from the decision would have to be dragged grudgingly from the
Bell System. Subsequent events illustrate Bell's reluctance to initiate any
substantial change in its foreign attachment policy.
Initially Bell proposed tariff changes which allowed only the use of
interconnection devices similar to the Carterfone, and of some types of
customer-provided terminal devices. This flaunting of the Carterfone
decision understandably generated strong, and often bitter, criticism
24. Cf. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa.
1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 507 (1961). The court held that while requiring a
service contract in connection with the sale of community antenna systems may have
been reasonable when the industry was developing and the risk of harm to Jerrold's
reputation and to the industry was based on more than "mere speculation," the
requirement became illegal "as the industry took root and grew."
25. Brief and Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Bell System Parties,
F.C.C. Docket Nos. 16942 & 17073, at 46. "A serious flaw in the presentation of . ..
the complainants .. .is the absence of evidence that the occasional use of the Carterfone
could not be adequately met by means of common carrier services."
26. Initial Decision of Hearing Examiner, Carterfone Device, F.C.C. Docket Nos.
16942 & 17073 (August 30, 1967) at 16 n.9. (unpublished opinion).
27. The Commisgion has authority to prescribe reasonable practices once it finds
that the carrier's practice violates the Act. 47 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1964). It gave no reason
for declining to do so. It also has the power to issue regulations necessary to accomplish
the purposes of the Act. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (b) (1964).
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from other equipment manufacturers." Bell has offered a series of
further changes which give the impression that it is opening its system
to interconnection with all types of equipment and private communica-
tions systems. The complaints of manufacturers and customers make it
clear that this relaxation of the restrictions is illusory. The tariff requires
that customer-provided equipment be connected with the telephone system
through a carrier-provided protection device and a carrier-provided net-
work control signalling device. These requirements impose an additional
cost on customers using non-carrier equipment and force manufacturers
to conform their equipment design to the carrier's device, thus reducing
their efficiency. In addition, the tariff requires carrier installation and
maintenance of the interconnection device, with charges for interconnec-
tion to include all telephone company costs, including engineering, design,
construction, maintenance, and return on investment. 9 The sham nature
of the relaxation is further illustrated by the application of the restrictions
to interconnection of private microwave systems. When the tariff changes
were announced, Bell stated that they would open the system to inter-
connection of all types, including private microwave. However, inter-
connection is limited to narrow "voice-grade" channels unsuitable for
efficient use of microwave, which utilizes broad bands."0 Under these
conditions, it is no surprise that a Bell System spokesman can express
optimism about the possibility of retaining customers for its leased
equipment in spite of the "relaxation" of the tariff restrictions."'
Although Bell's tariff restrictions appear to be clearly contrary to
the spirit, if not the letter, of the Carterfone decision, the FCC has allowed
them to go into effect, though it has not specifically approved them. 2
Thus the Bell equipment monopoly has survived, virtually intact, as it
28. See, e.g., Remarks of the National Retail Merchants Association, 34 Telecomm.
Rep., Sept. 23, 1968, at 2:
AT&T, in effect, seems to declare that it is going to ignore the Commission
order, that it is a law unto itself, disliking the implications of the Commission
order and deciding not to obey it.
29. 34 Telecomm. Rep., Nov. 4, 1968, at 2.
30. 35 Telecomm. Rep., March 10, 1969, at 1-7. The FCC policy since 1958 has
been to encourage the growth of private microwave systems. As a result of FCC deci-
sions easing restrictions on frequency sharing and forcing Bell to raise volume rates
instituted to eliminate private microwave competition, several large users of microwave
have announced that they are considering private systems. See 34 Telecomm. Rep.,
Nov. 18, 1968, at 33. However, such systems would not be practical in most instances
without interconnection since large users of microwave generally require systems which
are widespread geographically. See Irwin, The Comijumication Industry and the Policy
of Competition, 14 BuFFALO L. REv. 256 (1964) ; Beelar, note 7 supra.
31. 34 Telecomm. Rep., Nov. 4, 1968, at 2.
32. 35 Telecomm. Rep., Dec. 26, 1968, at 1. Because of the complaints about the
restrictions, the Commission has instituted a series of informal conferences to determine
the reasonableness of the network control signalling requirement.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
did after the Commission's earlier decision in Hush-A-Phone. However,
effective as the attachment restrictions are in excluding competition, they
protect only a small part of the equipment market. The more important
element in the maintenance of the equipment monopoly is the vertical
integration of the Bell System, which preserves for Western Electric
almost exclusive access to the Bell market.
II. Monopoly of the Bell System Market
Bell operating companies purchase their telephone equipment almost
exclusively from Western Electric, although they are not required to do
so." Their justification for the extent of such purchases is that Western
Electric has the lowest prices on most equipment, a fact invariably borne
out by Western's price comparison studies."' These lower prices result,
according to Bell, from efficiencies of vertical integration. The massive
Bell market assures high volume and allows mass production methods to
be utilized resulting in lower manufacturing costs. Also, Western does
not incur sales or credit costs. Further economies result from co-ordination
of development, production, installation and maintenance efforts. Thus,
Bell spokesmen conclude, vertical integration of Western and the Bell
System results in lower final cost of equipment and therefore lower rates
for telephone service than possible under competitive conditions.
As might be expected, given the importance of reasonable equip-
ment costs to effective rate regulation, the FCC has viewed Bell's
economies of integration argument with some skepticism. The Com-
mission's initial activity in this area stemmed from the Communications
Act of 1934, which directed the FCC to examine the vertical integration
question and make recommendations to Congress for additional legis-
lation."3 Pursuant to this directive and a later Congressional resolution,"
a full investigation of Bell's operations was launched in 1935. The study
found that Western's prices to Bell were unreasonably high, partly
because of an inadequate cost accounting system,"T and a request was
33. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (Private Line Rates), 34 F.C.C. 244,
280 (1961).
34. See Irwin, supra note 30, at 261.
35. 46 U.S.C. § 215(a) (1964) :
The Commission shall examine into transactions entered into by any common
carrier which relate to the furnishing of equipment . . . to such carrier
. . . and shall report to Congress . . . . The Commission . . . shall report
specifically whether in its opinion legislation should be enacted . . . (2)
subjecting such transactions to the approval of the Commission where the
person furnishing . . . the equipment . . . is a person directly . . . controlled
by, or under... common control with such carrier.
36. H.R.J. Ras. 8, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
37. Investigation of the Telephone Industry in the United States, H.R. Doc. No.
340, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 585-89 (1939). The Report recommended legislation authorizing
466
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made in the proposed report that Congress enact legislation requiring
competitive bidding on purchases of telephone equipment. This request
was dropped, however, when the Commission sent the final report to
Congress in 1939."s
Although it noted in its report the importance of keeping current
the material in the Telephone Investigation, the FCC took no further
action concerning Western until 1948, when, prompted by state com-
mission complaints, it instituted a joint state-FCC preliminary investiga-
tion of Western's prices. 9 This action apparently influenced Western
to reduce some prices, but the FCC was still unable to make an informed
judgment concerning the reasonableness of Western's prices or efficiency
of its operation.4 This situation had not improved by 1961, when, in an
investigation of Bell's rates for private line service, the FCC specifically
refused to find that Western's prices to Bell were reasonable.4 ' With
characteristic dispatch, the FCC rendered a final decision in this case in
1963,42 and ordered late in 1965 a full investigation of Bell's rate
practices, including prices paid to Western Electric." This investigation
has scarcely proceeded apace, with only the first phase completed and
Western in no imminent danger of investigation.
The FCC policy of attempting to insure the reasonableness of
Western's prices through indirect regulation has proven ineffective be-
cause the Communications Act gives the FCC authority to do little more
than compare Western's prices and profits with those of other manu-
facturers.44 Effective regulation requires that the Commission be able to
the FCC to institute cost accounting systems for manufacturing subsidiaries, but no
action was taken by Congress. Western reformed its accounting system after the
investigation. It is now required to maintain its accounting system according to generally
accepted principles under the terms of a consent decree entered in 1956. United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 5 Ta.knE REG. RFI. (1956 Trade Cas.) 71, 134 (D.N.J. 1956).
38. Congress has authorized the FCC to require competitive bidding with regard
to equipment and services for the communications satellite system and satellite ground
stations. 47 U.S.C. § 721 (1964).
39. 14 F.C.C. ANN. REP. 85 (1948).
40. See Antitrust Subcomm. No. 5, House Judiciary Comm., Report on the
Consent Decree Program of the Department of justice 73-78 (1958).
41. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (Private Line Rates), 34 F.C.C. 244,
281 (1961):
Accordingly, we find and conclude that AT&T's presentation is without
probative value in demonstration of the reasonableness of Western's prices
and profits with respect to its sales of equipment, services, and supplies to
the operating telephone companies in the Bell System.
42. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (Private Line Rates), 34 F.C.C. 217
(1963).
43. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (Rate Investigation), 2 F.C.C.2d, 871,
874 (1965).
44. The FCC has the power to obtain "full and complete information necessary to
enable the Commission to perform the duties . . . for which it was created" from carriers
and those persons directly controlled by carriers, 47 U.S.C. § 218 (1964) ; to require the
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establish a resonable rate of return on Western's investment, which can
be done now only indirectly and inadequately through reduction of Bell's
rate base. 5 The FCC could seek legislation authorizing it to regulate
carrier-controlled equipment manufacturers directly, thereby assuring
"reasonable prices," but, given the limitations of the regulatory process,
direct regulation would not insure efficient production.46 Thus extension
of regulation to Western should not be sought in lieu of compelled
disintegration under the antitrust laws unless it appears that, either
because telephone equipment production is a declining cost industry or
because Western's vertically integrated position within the Bell System
creates unique advantages, the telephone equipment industry is unable to
support competition.
Bell suggests that the telephone equipment market is a natural
monopoly sufficient to support only a single firm, since smaller scale
operation would result in higher production costs. This contention is
rendered suspect by the huge volume of Western's sales alone." Further-
more, the data relating efficiency to scale is inconclusive. Mass production
of telephone equipment seems to produce lower average costs, and Western
is able to utilize mass production for most types of equipment. 8 How-
ever, a large number of firms produce, under competitive conditions,
electrical apparatus no less complex than telephone equipment by similar
methods and from the same materials,49 with radio and television receivers
filing of all contracts of the carriers, 47 U.S.C. § 211 (1964) ; and to require annual
reports from persons controlled by carriers, 47 U.S.C. § 219 (1964). See also 47
U.S.C. § 215 (1964).
45. Cf. In Re Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 53 P.U.R. 3rd 513, 533 (Cal.
Pub. Util. Comm'n 1964) where the California Public Utilities Commission found
Western's prices unreasonable to the extent that Western's return on its sales exceeded
PT&T's allowable return.
46. The regulatory process has been criticized as providing no incentive for
efficiency or innovation and as providing a positive incentive to misallocate resources by
increasing capital costs. The latter tendency results from determining reasonable profit
as a percentage of net investment. See Averch and Johnson, Behavior of the Firmn Under
Regulatory Constraint, 52 Am. EcoN. REv. 1052 (1962); Loevinger, Regulation and
Competition as Alternatives, 11 ANTITRUST BULL. 101 (1966); see generally PERFoR-
MANCE UNDER REGULATION (H. Trebing ed. 1968).
47. Western Electric's sales in 1965 totaled over 3.3 billion dollars, with sales to
the Bell System of 2.8 billion dollars. The bulk of its non-Bell sales were to the United
States Government. 1965 Western Electric Annual Report.
48. Sheahan, Integration and Exclusion in the Telephone Equinnent Market, 70Q.J. EcoN. 249, 258-59 (1956).
49. See C. KAYSEN and D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLIcY 275 276, (1959) which
lists telephone and telegraph equipment manufacture as a tight oligopoly, with the first
eight firms having ninety-four per cent of the market, while in "radio and related
products" the first twenty firms hold slightly over half the market. See also Response of
Business Equipment Manufacturers Association, F.C.C. Docket No. 16979, at 125:
At present much equipment used by the common carriers is produced by a
comparatively small number of manufacturers. Economies of scale . . . in the
manufacture of a great deal of this equipment are negligible. Certainly they are
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only the more obvious examples. Moreover, the fact that smaller firms
are able to match and, occasionally, better Western's prices on some
equipment suggests that Western has exceeded the optimum scale of
production.5"
Bell's claim that vertical integration creates unique economies is
also unconvincing. For example, the alleged savings of sales and credit
costs is unlikely to be a significant factor. The value of coordination of
development and production efforts is also dubious, since it is clear that
monopolization retards rather than assists the rate of innovation in an in-
dustry.5 Furthermore, the benefits of coordination can be achieved with-
out vertical integration. Bell uses much standardized equipment which
could be purchased through competitive bidding on requirements con-
tracts. The successful bidder in each instance would enjoy with respect to
that contract the position now occupied by Western. Thus operations of
the manufacturer and Bell could be coordinated without completely
foreclosing other manufacturers from the Bell market.
The FCC itself has implicitly rejected the economies of integration
argument in its Above 890"2 and Carterfone5" decisions. In the Above
890 hearing, Bell contested the expansion of eligibility for private micro-
wave communication systems partially on the basis that allowing such
systems would promote competition of independent suppliers who could
not secure such economies and would lead to higher costs of communica-
tion service. The FCC rejected the Bell argument and allowed expanded
eligibility, noting that this expansion would "afford a competitive spur
in the manufacturing of equipment and in the development of the com-
munications art."54 Likewise, in Carterfone, the FCC apparently gave no
consideration to the Bell claim of "economies which result from unified
control of the selection, design, installation, operation and maintenance of
the telephone network."55 Rather, it held that "no one entity need
provide all interconnection equipment for our telephone system any more
than a single source is needed to supply the parts for a space probe."
Moreover, this unified control raises a danger which renders its
no more extensive than in many other light manufacturing industries such as
those producing electronic equipment and small electrical appliances.
50. See Sheahan, supra note 48, at 159.
51. See Scherer, Research and Development Resource Allocation under Rivalry,
81 Q.J. ECON. 359 (1967).
52. Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc., 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Above 890].
53. Carterfone Device, F.C.C. Docket Nos. 16942 & 17073 (June 27, 1968).
54. Above 890, supra note 52, at 414.
55. Brief and Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Bell System Parties,
F.C.C. Docket Nos. 16942 & 17073, at 20-21.
56. Carterfone, supra note 53, at 7.
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desirability doubtful. The operating companies and Western have com-
plete control of the choice of equipment to be offered to the public and
the rate of obsolescence assigned to equipment in the companies' plant;
therefore, introduction of improved equipment may be delayed until
the present plant is fully depreciated.57 Also, Bell may refrain from
introducing improvements initially developed by outside suppliers until
Western has developed a similar product. Whether or not deliberate
delay has occurred,58 the possibility of such activity is inherent in the
Bell System relationship and works against the public interest in efficient
telephone service.
Another danger lies buried in the joint ownership by Bell and
Western of Bell Telephone Laboratories. The expenses of Bell Labora-
tories are borne by both Bell and Western with Bell generally paying
the costs of research and fundamental development and including these
costs in its current operating expenses. 9 However, a significant per-
centage of Western's sales of equipment resulting from this research is
to non-Bell customers, particularly to the Government."0 Although some
attempt is made to allocate a portion of the research expenditures to these
sales, the figure is at best approximate.6 Consequently the joint use of
Bell Laboratories presents an opportunity for Western to lower its prices
to non-Bell customers at the public's expense. These possibilities for
abuse in the relationship and the unpersuasiveness of the economies of
integration argument render highly doubtful the contention that benefits
flow from Bell's vertical integration. Consequently the resolution of the
problems caused by the equipment monopoly should not be sought in
further regulation, but in the restoration of competition in the equipment
market through divestiture of Western from the Bell System.
Having only investigatory powers over subsidiaries of carriers,62
the FCC lacks authority to force divestiture of Western by Bell. The
appropriate source of the remedy is in the courts. An antitrust suit could
be brought under at least two theories. Under one theory, Western and
Bell would be considered as participants in a conspiracy to restrain trade
57. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (Rate Investigation), 9 F.C.C.2d 30,
77-78 (1967).
58. Several examples of delayed introduction of equipment have been alleged. See
Sheahan, supra note 48, at 262-65. See also J. GOULDEN, MONOPOLY 146-85 (1967).
59. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (Private Line Rates), 34 F.C.C. 244,
274 (1961).
60. See note 47 supra.
61. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (Private Line Rates), 34 F.C.C. 244,
274 (1961).
62. See note 44 supra.
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in the telephone equipment industry.63 Bell's control of Western would
not prevent the formation of a conspiracy for "restraint may result as
readily from a conspiracy among those who are affiliated or integrated
under common ownership as from a conspiracy among those who are
otherwise independent. .. "" An alternative view would be to show
monopolization of the equipment market by Bell through its subsidiary.65
This suit may be successful simply by virtue of Western's market share,
since that percentage comes very near even the strictest of tests thus far
laid down.66 Moreover, Western's market share understates its potential
market power since it does not make a serious effort to compete for the
business of independent telephone companies.6 7 If Western's size alone
is insufficient, the more general test would be used that a violation exists
if one "has the power to exclude competition. . . and has exercised it,"
and that power "is not attributable solely to the defendant's ability,
economies of scale, research, natural advantages, and adaptation to
inevitable economic laws."68 It can be convincingly argued that Western's
market power results not from its own ability, but, in large part, from
the legal monopoly which Bell holds. An overriding concern of the
antitrust laws has been the prevention of the extension of legal monopolies
into other areas.69 Moreover conduct which might be proper for less
powerful firms will be improper for a monopolist if the conduct tends to
63. 15 U.S.C. § 81 (1964): "Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in
restraint of trade.., is declared to be illegal."
64. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947). See also Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951). This view was expressed more
recently in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964) : "Every person who shall . . . monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States . . . shall be deenued guilty of a
misdeameanor..."
66. No exact market percentages have been set down by the courts, and the
standard seems to vary from industry to industry. The thirty-sixty-ninety dictum
(thirty per cent-certainly insufficient; sixty per cent--doubtful; ninety per cent-suf-
ficient) of Judge Hand is the most widely cited standard. United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2nd Cir. 1945). The Government recently obtained
modification of the decree in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110
F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), where the percentage was only sixty-six per cent,
(Wall Street Journal, Jan. 23, 1969, at 1, col. 3) and has filed suit against International
Business Machines whose market share is seventy-four per cent (Wall Street Journal,
Jan. 22, 1969, at 1, col. 3).
67. See Sheahan, vtpra note 48, at 259. Western uses a dual pricing system and
sells to non-Bell customers at higher prices. Under the terms of the 1956 consent
decree, the Government may order Western to cease this practice. United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Case.) 1f 71, 134 (D.N.J. 1956).
68. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 343 (D. Mass.
1953), affd per curiam-, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
69. See, e.g., patent cases such as International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392 (1947) ; Mercoid Corp. v. Midcontinent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944);
International Business Machines v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
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diminish competition."0 Bell's use of attachment restrictions to maintain
its market position in the equipment market may then constitute an
abuse of its monopoly power."
Bell's enforcement of the present tariff may also be a per se violation
of the Sherman Act notwithstanding an FCC determination that the
standards are reasonable. If Western is considered a separate party
under the antitrust laws, 2 the situation parallels that in Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke,73 where a trade organization of public
utilities and appliance manufacturers set standards for gas appliances, and
the utilities refused to provide gas service to persons using unapproved
equipment. The Supreme Court allowed an antitrust suit by a manu-
facturer who had been unable to obtain approval of his gas heater and
implied that, regardless of the reasonableness of the standards, this
arrangement was per se illegal. In the case of Western and Bell, FCC
approval of the standards may not insulate the conspiracy. The Supreme
Court has noted, concerning a rate-setting conspiracy, that while a finding
of reasonableness may preclude an award of damages, it does not prevent
a suit to enjoin the conspiracy, since there was no indication Congress
intended to immunize such conduct from the antitrust laws.74
However, application of the antitrust laws will meet with some
difficulty because of an earlier antitrust suit by the Department of
Justice which resulted in a consent decree in 1956."M A consent decree,
although the result of private negotiation rather than trial of issues, has
the same effect as a litigated decree, and Bell is likely to plead res
judicata as a defense to any further government antitrust actions. This
possibility raises no insuperable difficulties, however, for while the
courts recognize the application of res judicata to antitrust suits, they have
70. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) ; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern
Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
71. The FCC's finding that the blanket restrictions are unreasonable would make
the equipment monopoly more similar to a "power coupled with illegal restraints"
situation than to a "power abuse" situation. However, there have been complaints that
Bell has discontinued lower-priced equipment offerings, conduct which may, if sub-
stantiated, fall into the abuse category. See 34 Telcomm. Rep., Oct. 20, 1968.
72. See cases cited in note 64 supra.
73. 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
74. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 457-58 (1945). See also United
States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 358 n.16 (1959) wherein Warren,
C. J., stated that the Georgia decision was based on the danger that the conspiracy
would push rates to the "uppermost limits of the zone of reasonableness," a danger
equally present in the case of technical standards.
75. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.)
ff 71, 134 (D.N.J. 1956).
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been extremely reluctant to raise it as a barrier to subsequent actions. 7
The Supreme Court, noting the "public interest in vigilant enforcement
of antitrust laws, 7 7 has refused to bar an action involving private parties
based on the same course of wrongful conduct as alleged in an earlier suit
by the plaintiff which had been settled before trial and dismissed "with
prejudice" by court order. The court found it sufficient to establish a
new cause of action that the conduct complained of was subsequent to
the earlier decree and that there were additional allegations of antitrust
violations. The Department of Justice should have little difficulty alleging
conduct sufficient to meet this test, and the current AT&T rate investiga-
tion 8 may provide the requisite factual basis for the new cause of action
by documenting Western's market power and examining its practices
for abuse of that power.
An alternate approach would be for the Government to seek modi-
fication of the consent decree. A consent decree is subject to the con-
tinuing jurisdiction of the court in which it is entered, and may be
modified or terminated by the court at any time.79 Parties seeking
modification of a decree are subject to the severe test formulated in
United States v. Swift & Co.,"0 which requires a showing of a change
of conditions that so attenuates the dangers on which the decree is based
that it is no longer needed, and of undue hardship, because of "new and
unforeseen conditions," should the decree remain in force.8 This test
has generally been considered applicable to the Government as well as to
private parties, but several cases have cast doubt on that proposition. 2
76 See Dabney, Antitrust Consent Decrees: How Protective an Umbrella?, 68
YALE L.J. 1391, 1397-98 (1959). The Department of Justice apparently shares this view.
In January of this year, the Department filed an antitrust action against International
Business Machines Corporation charging monopolization under Section Two of the
Sherman Act, although an earlier Section Two action had been settled with a consent
decree in 1956. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 22, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
77. Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955). Where the
second suit is brought on the same facts but under a different statute, the courts have
denied the action to private parties, but have permitted it to the Government, dis-
tinguishing the result on the Government's special interest in enforcement of the
antitrust laws. Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 186 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951) ; Dabney, supra note 76, at 1400-05.
78. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (Rate Investigation), 2 F.C.C.2d 871,
874 (1965).
79. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932); F. JAmES, Civ
PROCEDU E § 11.8 (1965).
80. 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
81. Id. at 119.
82. See Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 562 (1942): "We think
the test to be applied in answering this question is whether the change served to
effectuate or to thwart the basic purpose of the original consent decree"; Hughes v.
United States, 353, 357 (1952), where the Court reversed the lower court's action
in modifying the decree because no hearing was held, but suggested that modification
of a consent decree is proper "where necessary to preserve competition and to prevent
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The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp." may have settled this issue. In United Shoe, the
district court held that modification of the decree could not be granted
because the decree had been effective in restoring competition to a
limited extent and that therefore the request could not meet the stringent
requirements of Swift. The Supreme Court, stating that the district court
had misconstrued its holding in Swift, ruled that "nothing in Swift
precludes" the court from granting a modification to achieve the "princi-
pal objects" of the decree.84 The Court noted that in Swift "the defendants
sought relief not to achieve the purposes of the decree, but to escape their
impact."85 Thus the Court has clearly applied a less stringent test to
the Government-a not unreasonable holding since public interest would
not have the Government bound perpetually by an unwise consent decree.88
The application of the achievement-of-principal-objects test to the
Western Electric decree raises some difficulty because the object of the
decree is not readily apparent. In the complaint filed in 1949, the
Government sought a broad range of relief, including separation of
Western from Bell and dissolution of Western into three competing
firms.8" However, of the major items of relief, only compulsory licensing
of patents was included in the 1956 decree; the remaining terms of the
decree dealt primarily with restrictions on the activities in which Western
monopoly"; Columbia Artists Management, Inc. v. United States, 381 U.S. 348
(1965), where the court affirmed a lower court decision which clearly modified a consent
decree, but the basis of the decision is unclear. See Note, Requests by the Government
for Modification of Consent Decrees, 75 YALE L.J. 657 (1965).
The Department of Justice in a report filed with the Antitrust Subcommittee took
the position that it would be able to seek modification of the decree if it could show that
modification was necessary to establish competition, citing Hughes v. United States,
supra. Antitrust Subcommittee No. 5, House Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess., Report on the Consent Decree Program of the Department of Justice 294
(1958).
83. 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
84. Id. at 249.
85. Id.
86. Although United Shoe involved modification of a litigated decree, its result
should apply to consent decrees as well. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S.
106, 114, (1932): "The result is all one whether the decree has been entered after
litigation or by consent." The United Shoe opinion implicitly supports this view; the
cases cited as authority for the district court's power "to modify the decree so as to
assure the complete extirpation of the illegal monopoly" are Swift and Chrysler, both
involving consent decrees. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S.
244, 251 (1968). See Note, Requests by the Government for Modification of Consent
Decrees, 75 YALE L.J. 657, 667-68 n.56 (1965), where the writer suggests that a more
lenient test has been applied by a few courts to modification of litigated decrees, and
argues that "[iun either case, should the advantage of hindsight prove modification to
be desirable, it makes little sense to remain imprisoned within the confines of the
original decree."
87. Details of the pleadings and relief sought are found in Antitrust Subcommittee
No. 5, House Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st. Sess, Report on the Consent
Decree Program of the Department of Justice 31-34 (1958).
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and Bell may engage. 8 The acceptance of this weak decree was apparently
prompted by a change in political administration and a resultant change of
opinion concerning the disruptive effect of divestiture. 9 However, the de-
cree retains the same objective as the original complaint-insurance of ef-
fective regulation of telephone rates by preventing inflated equipment
charges to the telephone companies. Thus the decree includes a provision
for patent licensing to encourage competition in the equipment market and
also provides that Western maintain a cost-accounting system consistent
with generally accepted accounting principles. These provisions have
proven completely insufficient for the achievement of the decree's objec-
tive. Consequently, the Government should be free to seek modification to
insure attainment of that goal.
Whether the Government institutes a new suit or seeks modification
of the consent decree, it should have little difficulty obtaining extensive
relief. The courts have a duty in monopolization cases to prescribe relief
which will "terminate the illegal monopoly, deny to the defendant the
fruits of its statutory violation and insure that there remain no practices
likely to result in monopolization in the future."9 Clearly necessary for
the restoration of competition are divestiture, disposal of Western's
interest in the Bell Telephone Laboratories and termination of its con-
tracts with the Bell operating companies. These acts alone may not be
sufficient, however, since Western would remain the dominant manu-
facturer of telephone equipment and would retain its close association with
Bell by virtue of its experience in manufacturing, installing and repairing
Bell's equipment. For this reason, serious consideration should be given
to the admittedly difficult task of dissolving Western into smaller, and
ideally, competitive firms.
Should dissolution prove possible, the institution of compulsory
competitive bidding by the Bell System in its purchase of telephone
88. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.)
71,134 (D.N.J. 1956). The decree limits AT&T to offering regulated communication
service, and Western Electric to manufacturing types of equipment which the Bell
System uses in providing communication services, subject to exceptions for services and
equipment provided to the Government. It also requires Western to maintain a cost
accounting system consistent with generally accepted accounting principles, but this
provision effected no change in Western's accounting procedures. M. GOLnBERG, THE
CONSENT DECREE: ITS FORMULATION AND USE 46 (1962).
89. See Antitrust Subcommittee No. 5, House Committee on the Judiciary, 86th
Cong., 1 Sess., Report on the Consent Decree Program of the Department of Justice
51-52 (1958). The Committee was extremely critical of the decree and the circumstances
surrounding its negotiations, and referred to it as "devoid of merit and ineffective as an
instrument to accomplish the purposes of the antitrust laws." Id., at 290.
90. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 250 (1968);
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 577 (1966); Schine Chain Theatres v.
United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128-29 (1948).
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equipment may be considered. This alternative would at least provide
incentive for the smaller suppliers to seek entry to the Bell System market
and, over time, might result in workable competition. There are difficulties
with obtaining this relief, however. An initial problem is illustrated in
United States v. Paramount Pictures.9 The Supreme Court refused to
institute competitive bidding because "the judiciary is unsuited to affairs
of business management and control through the power of contempt is
crude and clumsy and lacking in the flexibility necessary to make con-
tinuous and detailed supervision effective."9 However, the Court em-
phasized that competitive bidding in that industry would have been a high-
ly sophisticated matter" with only "dubious benefits" to competition. In
this instance, competitive bidding, involving generally comparable, if not
totally fungible, equipment for the telephone companies, would be much
easier to manage and would be almost essential to the restoration of work-
able competition. Moreover, in calling for bids for equipment, the Bell Sys-
tem, like the Pentagon, could surely provide detailed specifications which
all bidders must meet, and thereby render all bids comparable in pure
dollar terms. Under these circumstances a court might more readily grant
this relief.
The institution of competitive bidding might be improper for two
further reasons: it would conflict with the intent of Congress that the
FCC have exclusive power to regulate equipment purchases by the
telephone companies, and it would constitute judicial interference in an
area where the FCC has greater expertise and supervisory capacity.
These arguments fail because although the FCC has been given extensive
investigatory powers by Congress, it has not been given any power to act
directly on dealings with equipment suppliers.94 Thus Congress has not
expressed any intent to exclude the courts from this area. Furthermore,
the FCC's greater expertise is irrelevant where it has no power to
impose competitive bidding. Consequently, the courts should not hesitate
to utilize competitive bidding should that be essential to the re-establish-
ment of competition in the equipment market.
III. Conclusion
The restoration of competition in the telephone equipment market
will ease many of the problems raised by the FCC's decision in Carterfone,
91. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
92. Id. at 163.
93. Id. at 163. "It would involve the judiciary in the administration of intricate
and detailed rules governing priority, period of clearance, length of run, competitive
areas, reasonable return, and the like. The system would be apt to require as close
a supervision as a continuous receivership. . . ." And see, Gordon, The Legality of
Motion Picture Splits, 75 YALE L.J. 239, 258-59 (1965).
94. See note 44 supra.
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but divestiture is a long-range goal. Moreover, even if competition is
restored, Bell will have an economic interest, though somewhat lessened,
in maintaining control of the attachment market since use of its equip-
ment will increase the base on which its return is measured; and Bell will
also retain an interest in curbing the development of rival communication
systems through refusal to interconnect.95 Thus the FCC should eliminate
Bell's overly restrictive policy on attachments. Its action in allowing Bell
to prepare new tariff restrictions after Carterfone is clearly inadequate
and an abdication of its responsibility to the public under the Com-
munications Act. To expect disinterested consideration of standards from
a company involved in manufacture of competing equipment, especially
in light of past complaints about Bell's application of these restrictions, is
incredibly naive. Furthermore the FCC, since it may consider possible
antitrust violations in reaching decisions, 6 should recognize the anti-
competitive effect of allowing Bell to establish the standards for attach-
ments to the telephone system, and judge accordingly "the reasonableness
of any tariff which places control over petitioners' business in the telephone
companies in the first instance.""9T The FCC should exercise its authority
under the Communications Act98 and establish technical standards for
interconnection and a process for expeditious approval or disapproval of
equipment under those standards. The public interest requires only that
these standards be sufficient to insure a "rapid, efficient, . .. communica-
tion service" ;99 the Commission should not by its failure to act allow
standards which insure only the interest of Bell in protecting an equip-
ment market.
Gerald F. George
95. See text at note 7 supra.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 335, 348 (1959).
The FCC also has jurisdiction over violations of Section Three of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 21 (1964), although it is limited to issuing cease and desist orders.
97. See text at note 14 sutpra.
98. See note 27 supra.
99. 47 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1964).
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